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Abstract 
This paper examines the evolution of a social network in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game 
(MMOG) by modeling the players’ interaction network as a continuous-time markov chain. Results 
indicate that social hierarchy emerges out of an anarchical situation in which social actors participate 
voluntarily, have equal access to virtual resources from the beginning, cannot show their physical 
superiority and cannot show physical gestures during their communication / interaction. Our study 
findings hence contribute to the current interdisciplinary debate whether hierarchy is an emergent 
phenomenon that can be attributed to variations in individual qualities or whether hierarchy is an 
artificial outcome that is enacted on societies by parties that are privileged from birth. 
Keywords: Massively Multiplayer Online Games, MMOG, Hierarchy, Social Network Analysis, 
Exponential Random Graph Model, SIENA 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Power structure (syn. social hierarchy) terms a network of dominance-subordination relationships. 
Although considerable research has been devoted to the emergence of social hierarchy in different 
disciplines and in a variety of different settings (for an overview of the literature, see, for example, 
Sidanius & Pratto 2001), the authors are not aware of any formal model that tests for the emergence of 
social hierarchy within Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs).  
However, such a study might provide useful insights for scholars examining the emergence of social 
hierarchy (not only in the domain of information systems, but also in the domains of biology, 
anthropology, sociology, psychology political economy and management research), because it can 
address the question whether social hierarchy emerges out of anarchical situations in which social 
actors participate voluntarily, have equal access to virtual resources from the beginning, cannot show 
their physical superiority, and cannot use physical gestures during their communication / interaction. 
Results of this study provide evidence that social hierarchy even emerges when controlling for these 
factors which leads to several theoretical and managerial implications. Particularly, the findings 
contribute to the current interdisciplinary debate whether hierarchy is an emergent phenomenon that 
can be attributed to variations in individual qualities or whether hierarchy is enacted on societies by 
parties that are privileged from birth, and hence hierarchy is rather an artificial outcome (see, for 
example, Bonabeau & Theraulaz & Deneubourg 1999, Gould 2002). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides the conceptual underpinning, illustrates 
the current debate about the origin of hierarchies in a variety of different disciplines and develops a 
research hypothesis. The authors then describe the methodology employed, data collection and 
sample, and develop an empirical model. The next section, data analysis and results, highlights the 
study findings. The article concludes in the discussion section with theoretical and managerial 
implications as well as limitations of the study, and provides some suggestions for further research. 
2 CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNING, LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
Power structure (power hierarchy, dominance hierarchy or social hierarchy) is a core construct in a 
variety of different academic disciplines. In the remainder, the authors will refer to this construct as 
social hierarchy, because social hierarchy reflects the meaning of most constructs in the related 
academic disciplines.  
The etymological roots of hierarchy stem from the greek words hieros (engl. sacred) and archein (to 
rule). Originally hierarchy was used in a clerical context only. However, in today’s use hierarchy is 
defined as any ordered set of entities that can be classified as being inferior, superior or on the same 
level as one other. The authors prepend the attribute social to characterize a hierarchy in which the 
entities under observations are individual social actors. A social actor is any agent that is embedded in 
a network of agents whose actions and reactions influence each other. 
Several (conflicting) paradigms in the different academic disciplines provide patterns of explanation 
for the emergence of social hierarchies.  
In psychology, there is a recent research stream called “social dominance theory” (for an overview of 
the literature see, for example, Sidanius & Pratto 2001). Social dominance theorists argue that 
complex social systems are predisposed to form social hierarchies for the following reasons: Each 
individual of a social system is member in a particular social group, and all individuals tend to draw 
distinctions between in-group and out-group members. Each individual has a certain tendency to 
dominate individuals belonging to out-groups (called social dominance orientation). Therefore, over 
time a social hierarchy will evolve in society. One of the main research questions in social dominance 
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theory is which factors determine an individual’s social dominance orientation, and how social 
hierarchy is maintained over time. Similar streams of thought in psychology can also be found in 
“social identity theory” (e.g. Tajfel & Turner 2004). 
Biology has a long tradition in examining the emergence of hierarchies. In biology, these hierarchies 
generally are called dominance hierarchies when actors are animals and social hierarchies when 
actors are primates. As early as 1908, Wallace Craig (1908) published an article about social control in 
a group of pigeons. This stream of thought has been continued by researchers who mainly examined 
hierarchy in a group of birds (e.g. Chase 1982, Masure & Allee 1934, Schjelderup-Ebbe 1922). 
Meanwhile, dominance hierarchies have been examined for a variety of different species (for a review 
see, for example, Bonabeau et al. 1999) including primates (Mendoza & Barchas 1983). However, it is 
still disputed whether the formation of dominance hierarchies results from a self-organizing process or 
whether it results from preexisting differences between individuals. Current empirical data do not 
allow any statements about which assumption is right (for a review see, for example, Bonabeau et al. 
1999). 
A similar question is put up for discussion by sociologist and economists (see Gould 2002). Whereas 
some theories emphasize that hierarchies emerge and persist, because competent, hardworking and 
charismatic individuals are rewarded by society for their individual capabilities (e.g. social exchange 
theory (Blau 1964, Homans 1958) and human capital theory (Becker 1964)), other theories emphasize 
that an individual’s position in a hierarchy can rather be attributed to his / her (family) background, 
because over time some groups of individuals have excluded weaker individuals from access to valued 
resources (e.g. social change theory, Tilly 1999).  
To summarize, across all disciplines there are two dominant schools of thought about the origin of 
hierarchies in societies. Whereas the first stream of thought argues that hierarchy is an emergent 
phenomenon that can be attributed to variations in individual qualities, the second stream of thought 
argues that hierarchy is enacted by privileged incumbents and is largely independent of individual 
qualities. Rather, hierarchy is supposed to be an artificial outcome (Gould 2002).  
It would seem, therefore, that further investigations are needed in order to figure out whether 
hierarchy emerges out of anarchical situations in which each individual is furnished with the same 
resources from the beginning, participates voluntarily, cannot show his / her physical superiority and 
cannot use physical gesture during interaction (which is the case in the Massively Multiplayer Online 
Game under examination).  
When examining this research question, is it also important to consider the findings of IS researchers 
that deal with the emergence of social hierarchies.  
According to our knowledge, IS researchers have not yet developed a comprehensive theory about the 
emergence of social hierarchies. Nevertheless, there are several related streams of IS research such as 
adaptive structuration theory (e.g. DeSanctis & Poole 1994, Giddens 1979), critical social theory (e.g. 
Habermas 1979, Hirschheim & Klein 1994, Truman & Baroudi 1994), social network theory (e.g. 
Newell & Tansley & Huang 2004, Teigland & Wasko 2009), and leadership theory (e.g. McLeod 
1992, Wakefield & Leidner & Garrison 2008) that contribute to our understanding about the 
emergence of hierarchies. Particularly, studies in the domain of leadership theory provide results that 
are highly relevant for this research. For example, Yoo and Alavi (Yoo & Alavi 2004) distinguish 
between emergent and designated forms of leadership. Whereas emergent leadership develops through 
group processes over time, designated leadership is accorded due to authority spontaneously. In their 
research, Yoo and Alavi (2004) neglect designated leadership, but identify factors that lead to 
emergent leadership in virtual teams. Hence, they make an important contribution to the literature. 
However, hierarchy theory can extent leadership theory, because it does not focus on individual actor 
characteristics (at one hierarchical level) only (i.e. characteristics that lead leaders become leaders), 
but examines the emergence of leadership at several hierarchical levels at the same time.  
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Another stream of IS research that is of relevance to the research question are studies about MMOGs. 
However, despite MMOGs being on the research agenda for more than ten years (e.g. Parks & Floyd 
1996), there has been surprisingly little research on this topic, and these studies are mainly descriptive 
(Putzke et al. in print). The authors are aware of only one formal model that tests a theory of social 
selection and influence in MMOGs. Putzke et al. (in print) analyzed the evolution of the players’ 
interaction network in the German MMOG Ocean Control. They find that the same structural effects 
and demographic variables as in the real world influence the evolution of the players’ interaction 
network. Furthermore, they do not find evidence, that the players’ virtual performance in the game 
influences the process of network evolution (vice versa). The findings by Putzke et al. (in print) will 
particularly considered when selecting the control variables for this study. 
Since IS researchers have not yet developed a comprehensive theory about the emergence of social 
hierarchies, the research hypothesis development will also draw on theories from related academic 
disciplines.  
When examining the emergence of social hierarchies, a focal point of analysis is who seeks to interact 
with whom. Principally, there are two reasons for players to seek interaction in a social hierarchy.First, 
players who are high in hierarchy seek to dominate players that are low in hierarchy or on the same 
hierarchical level. Dominating means, that players try to influence the other players’ actions by threat 
of sanctions in case that low hierarchy individual do not act in their interests (compare Katz & Kahn 
1966). Second, players that are low in hierarchy seek advice and / or support from players that are high 
in the players’ social hierarchy (Deutsch & Coleman & Marcus 2006, Yamaguchi 2003), or they seek 
interaction to those high in hierarchy to pledge for behaveor toward them in a need gratifying fashion 
(Cohen 1958). In the first case, the players who want to dominate seek to interact with people on lower 
(or the same) hierarchical levels, and in the second case the players who seek for advice / support seek 
to interact with players on the same or higher hierarchical levels. However, they usually do not tend to 
seek advice from lower hierarchical levels (Yamaguchi 2003).  
A qualitative analysis of the dataset used in this study (see section 3.2) revealed that most 
communication in the game analyzed was task related, and that players sought for support when 
seeking for interactions. The following dialogue illustrates a typical communiation between two 
random actors: 
User_1427: ”Could you borrow me some steel, otherwise I cannot advance. I will return the favor. 
Mfg” 
User_1146: ”Of course, how much do you need and to where shall I deliver? Best greetings” 
User_1427: ”I have place for 10000 and please deliver to LOCATION NUMBER ANONYMIZED and 
I will allow you to use the petrol station and you will get petrol for free. thx in advance”  
User_1146: ”Hmm, I only do have 7000 at the moment. But this is better than nothing. *g* You do not 
have to grant me access to the petrol station. If I fit into the harbor, I can get petrol for free there :)” 
Hence, the research hypothesis development will focus on social hierarchy that emerges due to 
seeking for support. (However, the same argumentation holds for hierarchy that emerges due to 
seeking dominance over other players).  
In this context, it is important to introduce the concepts of transitive triplets and intransitive triplets in 
a social network (see Chase 1982, Davis 1970).1 Figure 1 depicts an intransitive triplet. The boxes in 
Figure 1 depict three actors i, j and h. The arrows between the players indicate which player is seeking 
to interact with whom. It can be interpreted as ”If player i seeks to interact with player j and player j 
seeks to interact with player h, also player h should seek to interact with player i.”  
                                              
1
 The definition of a social network is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to introductory text books about 
social network  analysis (Wasserman & Faust 1994). 
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Figure 1.  Intransitive Triplet
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because if actor i seeks support from actor 
seek support from actor i, because actor 
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Figure 2. Transitive Triplet
 
In the remainder of the paper, this type of tie seeking behavior (i.e. avoiding ties that close intransitive 
triplets and seek ties that close transitive triplets) will be referred to as 
social hierarchy. 
The counterpart to the aforementioned tie seeking behavior is a 
context of this study, random tie seeking behavior
hierarchical level when seeking their partners for interaction.
factors (i.e. actor characteristics, network characteristics and other control variables) actors are equally 
likely to seek ties to partners who are on different hierarchical levels. 
In summary, the authors expect 
hierarchy his higher than the likelihood of a random tie. Hence,
 
H1: Players are more likely to seek a tie that establishes 
not establish social hierarchy
 
i
j
i
j
 
 
j, and actor j seeks support from actor 
i is supposed to be on a lower hierarchical level. 
Figure 
i seeks to interact with player j and player 
interact with player h”. The number transitive triplets should be 
should seek support from players that are on 
 
 
tie seeking that establishes a 
random tie seeking behavio
 means that players do not consider players’ 
 Rather, after controllling for all other 
 
that a players’ likelihood of seeking a tie that establishes a 
 
social hierarchy than seeking a 
. 
h
h
 in a social hierarchy, 
h, actor h should not 
 
2). A transitive triplet 
j seeks to interact with 
the same 
r. In the 
social 
tie that does 
Page 5 of 12 18th European Conference on Information Systems
3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND DATASET 
3.1 Methodology 
The authors test the hypothesis using a stochastic actor-driven modeling approach proposed by 
Snijders (e.g. Snijders & van de Bunt & Steglich 2009). This approach stands in the tradition of 
models examining the evolution of social networks (for an introduction, see Doreian & Stokman 1997, 
Robins & Snijders & Wang & Handcock & Pattison 2007, Wasserman & Pattison 1996). The authors 
decided to employ this methodology because it is the most advanced methodology to draw statistical 
inferences about tie-oriented network dynamics when analyzing a given node set in a longitudinal 
study. For example, the methodology also allows drawing inferences about network changes and 
controlling for actors’ attributes (such as gender) and structural micro effects simultaneously. 
Furthermore, most standard statistical methods cannot be employed when analyzing social network 
data due to structural autocorrelation and violation of the i.i.d. assumption. The first application of this 
methodology in IS research and research about MMOGs is a recent study by (Putzke et al. in print) 
that also provides further reasoning for the choice of the methodology and will serve as a basis for this 
research. 
3.2 Data Collection and Sample 
To test the proposed hypothesis, the authors used Putzke and colleagues’ dataset (see Putzke et al. in 
print, for a detailed description of the dataset). This dataset comprises all interactions and activities of 
the first 2,000 registered players in the German MMOG Ocean Control over a period of six months in 
2006.  
The basic idea of Ocean Control is that players own islands. These islands provide the players with the 
necessary resources for building up states. Players can fight against each other and conquer foreign 
islands by training and commanding military units. Players can also support each other by exchanging 
and trading resources, as well as establishing contracts for mutual support during fights. Players can 
obtain information about the other players either by observing the other players’ actions in the game, 
or by inspecting the other players’ profiles. These profiles contain, amongst others, different 
performance metrics (e.g. the players’ current rankings in the game), the players’ alliance 
memberships (as well as performance metrics of the alliances) as well as free text fields.  
The dataset is an interesting basis for further analysis, because all players in the game are furnished 
with the same amount of “physical resources” and the same “social status” when starting the game. All 
players started playing the game at approximately the same moment in time. Furthermore, they can 
neither show their physical superiority nor use physical gestures during their interactions. Finally, all 
players participate voluntary in the game, and the game starts with an “anarchical situation” without 
previous interactions between players.  
Following Putzke et al. (in print), we used the same subsample of actors and divided the dataset into 
three two-month periods. In the following, X(t)=Xij(t) denotes an n×n adjacency matrix where xij=1(0) 
represents a tie (no tie) from actor i to actor j (i,j=1,…n) in period t, that is, player i sends at least two 
messages to player j (i→j) (for a reasoning of the cut-off value of two see Putzke et al. (in print)). We 
opted for the same three two-month periods, and not a greater number of shorter periods, to keep the 
number of tie changes between subsequent observations high enough to allow for reasonable 
estimations. Indeed, the Jaccard distances between two subsequent observations (Jδ (t1, t2) =.716; Jδ (t2, 
t3) =.647) fall within acceptable levels (compare Snijders et al. 2009).  
3.3 Model Development 
Following Snijders (for an introduction see, for example, Snijders 1996, Snijders et al. 2009), we 
model the network evolution as a Markov-process Y(t)=(X(t), Z(t)) on the space of all adjacency 
matrices X(t), as well as all actors’ characteristics Z(t). We calculate the transition intensities of the 
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transition matrices between the different states y(t) of the Markov-process by discrete choice models 
(for an introduction see, for example, Train 2003). During each choice, an actor is either allowed to 
change a tie variable, change one of his / her characteristics or not to change anything. The choices are 
supposed to arrive for each actor at randomly determined moments in time that follow an exponential 
distribution. In the choice models for tie choices, the probability of an actual change taking place is 
modeled by an actor’s so called “objective function”. The objective function reflects the value an actor 
attributes to the current network configuration. The objective function is supposed to capture all 
relevant information and resembles an ordinary regression function. At the randomly determined 
moments in time, each focal actor tries to maximize her/his “objective function” by changing her/his 
personal network configuration. Hence, the parameters and variables of the objective function can be 
interpreted in a similar way like the parameters of an ordinary discrete choice model / logistic 
regression. For example, the most basic effect included in almost every model is an actor’s outdegree ( 
β ∑ 
 ). This effect increases an actor’s objective function by value 1 if this player seeks a 
new tie, because the corresponding value in the adjacency matrix xij equals 1 if there is a tie present 
(and is 0 otherwise). Hence, a negative parameter estimate β indicates that each tie is 
associated with some “cost” for the player and he does not seek as much ties as possible. 
3.4 Operationalization 
3.4.1 Hierarchy 
To draw inferences about the players’ tendency to seek ties that establish hierarchy, the authors added 
two triadic effects to the players’ objective function. The first effect reflects the number of player i’s 
transitive triplets β ∑ 
, 

 . The product 


becomes 1, only if all ties between 
players i, j and h as illustrated in Figure 2 are present (and equals 0 otherwise). Hence, a positive 
estimator β indicates that player’s are more likely to seek for a tie that closes a transitive 
triplet.  
The second effect added to the players’ objective function reflects player i’s tendency to seek for 
intransitive triplets β ∑ 
, 

.2 Hence, a negative parameter estimate β 
indicates that players are less likely to seek a tie that closes an intransitive triplet. 
In summary, a positive parameter estimate β and a negative parameter estimate β  
both at the same time provide strong evidence that players tend to seek ties that establish social 
hierarchy.  
3.4.2 Control Variables 
Following Putzke et al. (in print), the authors included the following control variables: 
• An outdegree effect β ∑ 
  that has already been explained above, and indicates whether 
seeking ties is associated with some “cost”. 
• A reciprocity effect β ∑ 
 
 that captures whether players’ are more likely to seek 
interactions with other players that also seek to interact with them. Hence, a positive parameter 
β  indicates that players are more likely to seek ties to other players that seek ties to 
them. 
• An effect controlling for alliance homophily β  ∑ 
  ! =  !# where I 
is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if both players belong to the same alliance, i.e. a 
positive estimate β indicates that players are more likely to seek interaction with 
other players that belong to the same alliance in the game. 
                                              
2
 Intransitive triplets are sometimes also called intransitive triads, triangles, pecking triangles or 3-cycles. 
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• Three effects controlling for gender homophily: (1) a gender ego effect β  ∑ 
$!%!&  
where gender is coded 1 for men and 2 for women (i.e. a positive estimate β   indicates that 
women are more likely to seek partners for interaction) (2) a gender alter effect 
β  ∑ 
$!%!&  that indicates whether women are more likely to be sought as partners for 
interaction, and (3) a gender homophily effect (see above) β  ∑ 
 $!%!& =
$!%!&' (compare above). 
•  An age ego effect β  ∑ 
$!  indicating whether old people are more likely to seek partners 
for interaction. 
Finally, Putzke et al. (in print) control in their paper for “popularity of alter”, i.e. whether players are 
more likely to seek ties to other players that have a high popularity. They calculate the popularity of 
alter effect by β (

∑ 
 ∑ 
   which reflects 1/n times the in-degree of all other players j to 
whom player i is tied. Since the same popularity of alter effect cannot be estimated with the new 
version of SIENA (3.17s) anymore, the authors decided to control for popularity of alter by adding 
β ∑ 
 ∑ 
   to the objective function. 
4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The authors conducted a nested model comparison to test the proposed hypothesis (see Snijders et al. 
2009). All models were estimated using SIENA 3.17s. In a series of Neyman-Rao tests, the authors 
compare a model that allows both hierarchy parameters to vary freely against a baseline model that 
restricts one (or both) hierarchy parameters to be zero, but includes all control variables. The authors 
do not report any measure of explained variation, because there are as yet no satisfactory measures for 
this stochastic-actor driven modeling approach. 
The series of Neyman-Rao tests indicate that the inclusion of both hierarchy effects into the model 
(see Table 3) at the same time increases model fit (χ² = 639.997; d.f. = 2; p < .0001), and that the 
increased model fit can be attributed to both effects, i.e. to transitivity (χ ² = 202.223; d.f. = 1; p < 
.0001) as well as to linear structuring / intransitivity (χ ² = 136.5124; d.f. = 1; p < .0001).  
Furthermore, both effects are found to be statistically significant (p <.001) and in the expected 
direction. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported and it can be concluded that players are more likely to 
seek a tie to a partner that establishes social hierarchy than seeking a random tie, even if all players 
are furnished with the same resources from the beginning of the game. 
 
 Beta s.d. t-value p-value 
Rate Parameter (t=1) 28.8844 5.1460 5.6130 .00000 
Rate Parameter (t=2) 23.2919 3.1553 7.3818 .00000 
Outdegree -2.7378 .1401 -19.5418 .00000 
Reciprocity 3.1922 .1743 18.3144 .00000 
Popularity -.0258 .0136 -1.8971 .05782 
Alliance Homophily .5595 .0753 7.4303 .00000 
Gender Alter .2846 .1599 1.7799 .07510 
Gender Ego -.0505 .1587 -.3182 .75033 
Gender Homophily .0198 .0882 .2245 .82238 
Age Ego .0184 .0056 3.2857 .00102 
Transitive Triplets (Hierarchy I) .4202 .0546 7.6960 .00000 
Intransitive Triplets (Hierarchy II) -.5645 .1097 -5.1459 .00000 
Table 3. Model Results 
Concerning the control variables, the results are in line with the results obtained by Putzke et al. (in 
print). However, the authors did not find some of the effects to be statistically significant (at α=.05) 
that were found to be significant by Putzke et al. (in print) such as the “gender alter” and the 
“popularity” effect. The nonsignificant effects might be explained by the relatively low Jaccard 
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coefficients and the two additional “control variables” in the behavioral function. It is very likely that 
a greater number of tie changes between two subsequent periods would lead to significance of those 
parameters. Furthermore, the authors controlled for a slightly different popularity effect, because the 
effect estimated by Putzke et al. (in print) cannot be estimated with the new version of SIENA (3.17s) 
anymore. 
As a final step of analysis, the authors respond to Putzke and colleagues’ (in print) call for research, 
and analyze whether men are more likely to seek interaction with women (vice versa). Although the 
authors do not draw any inferences about these effects in this paper, they use the parameter estimates 
obtained from the model (see Table 3) to answer this research question by calculations.  
The three gender effects were added to the players’ objective function as the linear combination 
β  ∑ 
$!%!& + β  ∑ 
$!%!& + β  ∑ 
 $!%!& = $!%!&#. 
The value that a particular tie is adding to the players’ objective functions can be calculated by 
replacing the parameters through their estimates (i.e. β  =.051; β  =.285; 
β  =.018) and centered values (i.e. $!%!&=.814 for female and $!%!&=-.186 for male). 
For example, a women who seeks a tie to another women increases her objective function by  
Δ = −.051 ∗ 1 ∗ .814 + .285 ∗ 1 ∗ .814 + .018 ∗ 1 ∗ 1 = 0.210 
 
  Alter 
  Female Male 
Ego Female .2104 -.0940 Male .2411 -.0237 
Table 4. Summary of Gender Effects 
Table 4 summarizes these calculations for all four different types of dyads (i.e. female seeking ties to 
female, female seeking ties to male, male seeking ties to female, and male seeking ties to male). The 
results can be interpreted as follows.  
Both, female and male players have a tendency to seek females as partners for interaction (Δ > 0). 
Furthermore, both, female and male players, have a tendency to avoid men as partners for interaction 
(Δ < 0). That means, whereas there is homophily between female players (Δ =.2103), male players 
tend to avoid ties to the same gender (Δ = -.024).  
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study tests a hypothesis about the emergence of social hierarchies in MMOGs. The authors are 
not aware of any other formal model analyzing social hierarchies in MMOGs. Results indicate that 
hierarchy even emerges out of anarchical situations in which each individual is furnished with the 
same resources from the beginning, participates voluntarily, and cannot show its physical superiority 
or use physical gestures during interaction. Since Putzke et al. (in print) provide evidence that findings 
from MMOGs regarding social selection and influence might also hold in the real world, this study 
might contribute to the long-lasting debate whether the emergence of (human) social hierarchy can be 
attributed to situations that individuals encounter due to chance by birth, or whether hierarchy is a 
process that can be attributed to other individual characteristics. In MMOGs, a hierarchy emerges even 
if players are equipped with the same resources from the beginning of a game. 
For this study, the authors used the same dataset as Putzke et al. (in print). As part of their findings, 
they replicated the results obtained by Putzke et al. (in print). Replicating the results is important, 
because the employed estimation procedures are stochastic in nature. In general, the obtained results 
are in line with Putzke et al. (in print). However, the authors do not only replicate these findings, but 
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give further reasons for splitting the data into the same three periods (i.e. Jaccard distances ≈ .7). 
Finally, they also illustrate how to calculate whether female are more likely to seek male as partners 
for repeated interaction (vice versa). They find that both genders have a tendency to seek female as 
partners for interaction, and both genders tend to avoid male as partners for interaction. Whereas there 
is a homophily effect between women (i.e. women prefer to seek other women as partners for 
interaction), men preferably do not seek other men as partners for interactions.  
5.2 Managerial Implications 
The demonstrated effects regarding the emergence of hierarchies are also pertinent to a managerial 
audience. 
First, results indicate that hierarchy emerges out of anarchical situations by itself. Therefore, even in 
corporate cultures / work groups that emphasize that they do not have a (formal) hierarchy, it is 
necessary to keep track of emerging informal hierarchies to avoid the emergence of unmanageable 
forms of hierarchy. 
Second, managers are often criticized by the left for having achieved their social status and 
hierarchical positions due to chance by birth, educational credentials and the social capital they 
encountered. This study, however, provides evidence that hierarchies are not only imposed on society 
by a predominant elite that is privileged by birth, but that hierarchies rather result from a process of 
individual behaviour. Hence, this study offers reasoning and justification in the moral debate on social 
hierarchy. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As with any empirical study this work is subject to limitations that offer interesting ways for future 
research.  
First, although all players are furnished with the same resources from the beginning of the game, their 
behavior in the game might be influenced by their social status in real life. Therefore, future research 
should analyze whether players that have a high social status in the game’s hierarchy also have a high 
social status in real life.  
Second, players might participate in several MMOGs at the same time, use the same nickname in 
different games and transfer their virtual status from one game to the other. Future research should 
hence analyze these effects in more detail.  
Third, this study is subject to some limitations imposed by the methodology employed (see Snijders & 
Steglich & Schweinberger 2007) and by the data used for model testing (see Putzke et al. in print). 
Particularly, there have not yet been developed any satisfactory measures of explained variation. 
Future research should try to develop such a measure. 
Despite its limitations, we hope that this paper has the potential to stipulate interesting discussions at 
ECIS 2010 in Pretoria, and contributes to the current debate whether hierarchies are enacted on society 
by parties that are privileged from birth or whether hierarchies even emerge out of anarchical 
situations in which each actor is equipped with equal access to resources.  
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